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The first week of law school is for most students an intimidating experience.
Everyone is so serious. My first week was leavened considerably by Harry
Kalven. A group of students and Kalven were watching the seventh game of
the 1964 World Series in the student lounge of the University of Chicago Law
School. The broadcast was interrupted by a news bulletin: Nikita Khrushchev
had just been deposed. Viewers were treated to several minutes of political
and diplomatic analysis, with correspondents around the globe speculating
on what this might mean for East-West relations. One of my classmates, an
amateur Kremlinologist no doubt, expressed surprise: “I can’t understand
why they would do this now.” Kalven agreed: “Yeah, in the seventh inning.”
Though well liked and greatly respected, Harry Kalven was not the most
popular teacher in the law school during my time as a student. Some classmates
thought his classes moved too slowly, that he belabored and repeated points.
Everyone warmed to his wit, his imagination, and his generous spirit, but
not everyone found in Kalven’s classes the crackling intellectual tension, the
rigor, the sense of analytic closure that some other teachers provided. By any
measure Kalven was a good, effective teacher. But was he a great one?
For me, he was more than a great teacher. He was a unique force in my
education. He remains a continuing force. Other former students—practicing
lawyers, law teachers, law school graduates who have made careers outside of
law—tell me the same thing. His ideas stick in the mind; his personal example
continues to lead. His teaching has stood the test. He seems an even better
teacher now than he did at the time.
All the more remarkable is Kalven’s staying power when one considers that
he was quintessentially a man of his times, an observer, a writer and teacher
who was at his best when responding. He wrote mostly about recent cases and
issues of current public controversy. His thought seemed always in progress,
constantly on the lookout for more facts and better formulations. Kalven was
interested in theories and produced a number of theoretical insights, but neither
in the classroom nor in his writings did he offer anything like a systematic,
well-elaborated personal perspective. He was the most creative legal thinker I
have known, but his scholarship was patently, proudly, derivative. He was not,
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and did not try to be, a definitive thinker. Nor was he a forceful personality. He
was the antithesis of a self-promoter. And yet he left his mark on his field and
on his students in a way that few professors ever do.
The word that best describes Harry Kalven is “inquisitive.” To him learning
was a joyous, almost playful activity—not a chore, not a source of power or
distinction, more an experience than a quest. His inquisitive mind observed
no boundaries; he never became a prisoner of his own expertise. His work as
a scholar was unforced.
Kalven’s love of exploration is one reason, I think, why his closest
professional companions were other teachers at heart, most notably Walter
Blum, Charles Gregory, and Alexander Meiklejohn. What other lifelong liberal
could have written the book Kalven co-authored with Blum, The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation?1 It says much about their character that two colleagues with
such divergent political convictions could have collaborated so successfully on
an inquiry that touches a major nerve of the liberal-conservative divide. That
Blum and Kalven were able to bridge their differences and jointly advance
a bold critique on a sensitive subject probably traces to the fact that, for all
their scholarly accomplishments, these virtuosos of the classroom were first
and foremost teachers. The book’s insouciant, unscripted analysis suggests
that both authors brought to the project a pedagogic agenda: to learn, to test,
to provoke, to embarrass dogma.
In Kalven’s work with Gregory, the creative synergy that spawned a
remarkably user-friendly yet insidiously demanding torts casebook2 was
enriched by a shared sense of humor. Gregory’s account of a Kalven prank
well captures the fun they had as torts teachers:
Harry visited me in Charlottesville when I was recovering from an illness. Our
lawn needed cutting badly, and Harry volunteered. He got the power mower
going (mirabile dictum) and went at it industriously, for we had a big lawn. After
some time I looked out from an upstairs window and saw that right in the
middle of the lawn Harry had cut, in huge letters, the word “CARDOZO.”
How could I help adoring a guy who would do that to make me feel better?3

Kalven always considered himself a student of Meiklejohn, though he never
took a course from the legendary teacher and philosopher of education. The
special quality of their relationship comes across in remarks each made about
the other. Meiklejohn introduced his most important law review article by
explaining:
1.

Published initially as a law review article. See Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952) reprinted as University of Chicago
Law School Reprint and Pamphlet Series No. 11.

2.

Charles O. Gregory & Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts (1st ed. Little, Brown
1959).

3.

Charles O. Gregory, Harry Kalven: Scholar and Friend, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 8 (1975).
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The writing of this paper is largely due to the friendly insistence of Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr. of the Law School of the University of Chicago. He and I
have had, in recent years, a continuing exchange of ideas. Professor Kalven
tells me that he is not sure that my interpretation of the First Amendment can
stand the test of lawyer-like application to the many specific situations which
the courts must handle.4

In turn, Kalven ended his most important law review article, asserting
the historic importance of New York Times v. Sullivan, by reporting that he had
discussed the case with the 92-year-old Meiklejohn shortly after it was decided:
It is perhaps a fitting postscript to say that I had occasion this summer to
discuss the Times case with Mr. Meiklejohn. Before I had disclosed my own
views, I asked him for his judgment of the Times case. “It is,” he said, “an
occasion for dancing in the streets.” As always, I am inclined to think he is
right.5

In his memorial tribute to Meiklejohn, Kalven emphasized his mentor’s gift
for making learning enjoyable:
I have always suspected that Socrates, however wise and admirable, would
have made a trying and difficult companion. “Alec” was a Socrates who wore
well, a Socrates it was fun to be with, a Socrates for all seasons.6

Not only Kalven’s collaborators but also his intellectual adversaries
appreciated the love of give and take that he brought to his work. Here is
Guido Calabresi (another born teacher) describing what it was like to begin
his career by matching wits with Kalven:
In 1960 I walked into an office at The University of Chicago Law School.
There I found Walter Blum and Harry Kalven. They had just read a draft of
what was to become my first article. Harry greeted me with: “it’s all wrong
. . . but I wish I had written an article like that when I was your age!” This
began the debate. Blum and Kalven delivered the Shulman Lectures at Yale,
Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto Compensation Plans. I struck
4.

Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 246
n.4.

5.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev.191, 221 n.225 [hereinafter Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case].

6.

Adam R. Nelson, Education and Democracy: The Meaning of Alexander Meiklejohn, 1872–
1964 330 (Univ. of Wis. Press, 2001).
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back in Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven; but they had
the last laugh in The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi. I believe that the law of torts
benefitted from that hard fought polemic. I know that I, as a young scholar,
could not have had a tougher, or more loving, initiation to scholarship.7

Kalven wrote and taught on a diverse range of legal subjects. His first major
scholarly achievement was in the field of civil procedure, a 1941 article that was
ahead of its time in appreciating the potential significance of the class action
lawsuit.8 In addition to their book on progressive taxation and their running
debate with Calabresi, Blum and Kalven produced critiques of many of the
modern “no-fault” reform proposals for compensating victims of automobile
accidents.9 Kalven published articles on a number of other tort topics,10 even as
the casebook he co-edited with Charles Gregory remained the preferred forum
for presenting his ideas about torts. With Hans Zeisel and others he conducted
an ambitious empirical study of jury behavior.11 A valuable by-product of the
jury study was a series of reflections by Kalven on the use of social science
methods in the study of legal problems and institutions.12 Toward the end of
his life, he taught a seminar on slavery. He was never superficial and he was
frequently penetrating. But he liked to move on, to explore fresh terrain.
One legal subject, however, engaged him more completely and more
continuously than any other. Harry Kalven never tired of thinking about
the freedom of speech and he never ran out of fresh, important things to
say about the subject. Thirty-seven years after his death, in some cases more
than fifty years after initial publication, his writings on obscenity,13 legislative
7.

Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr.,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1975).

8.

Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941).

9.

See Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Cost, and Compulsions in Auto Compensation
Legislation, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 341 (1973); Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., A Stopgap Plan
for Compensating Auto Accident Victims, 1968 Ins. L. J. 661 (1968); Harry Kalven, Jr., A
Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System, 1 Conn. L. Rev. 33 (1968).

10.

See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or
the Legislature Decide?, in Symposium on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (1968); Harry
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 326 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 Calif.
L. Rev. 189 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views—Torts, 31
U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1964); Harry Kalven, Jr., Strict Liability, 9 Loy. L. Rev. 31 (1958); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 158
(1958).

11.

See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown 1966); Hans Zeisel,
Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Little, Brown 1959).

12.

See Harry Kalven, Jr., Toward a Science of Impartial Judicial Behavior, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev.
(1973); Harry Kalven, Jr., Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at the
University of Pennsylvania, 11 J. Legal Educ. 94 (1958).

13.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
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investigations into political beliefs,14 street demonstrations,15 and libel16 remain
the classic texts from which almost all subsequent work takes off. Two entries
on the short list of important concepts in the modern law of free speech, the
“public forum” and the “heckler’s veto,” were first identified (and memorably
named) in Kalven writings.17 His article on New York Times v. Sullivan greatly
shaped the way that case has been understood ever since. Kalven transformed
the Times precedent into much more than a holding about libel law simply
by spotlighting and celebrating three features of Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion: its analogizing of a libel suit by a public official to the infamous
criminal prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798,18 its assertion that the
First Amendment has a “central meaning,”19 and its discovery of “a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”20
It is a fitting tribute to the devotion Kalven could inspire that his major
book on the First Amendment, A Worthy Tradition, left unfinished at his death
in 1974, was painstakingly and perceptively brought to completion by his son
Jamie. This editing project, assisted by Kalven’s former colleague Owen Fiss,
extended over fourteen years. Jamie, like his father a gifted writer but as a
journalist rather than a lawyer or scholar, achieved an expert’s command of
the intricate law of the First Amendment, consulted student notes from his
father’s classes (a nationwide call for old notebooks went out), then tested
and sharpened his editorial judgments in several workshops before major law
faculties. Astonishingly, the book suffers hardly at all from the circumstances
of its authorship. It is a contemporary book, one that challenges and inspires
today’s students of the First Amendment.
What explains Harry Kalven’s striking capacity to live on in the minds of
his students and readers? I believe he remains influential because he had an
uncanny ability to engender creativity in others—in his students, in his readers,
even I would guess in his collaborators. Driven by a genuine curiosity, he
tried to enlist those around him in the search. To sit in a Kalven classroom
was to be a participant, not an auditor. I was called on to recite only a handful
14.

Harry Kalven, Jr. & Roscoe Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate
Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 Law in Transition 155 (1961); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (1960).

15.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.

16.

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267; Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5.

17.

See Kalven, Jr., supra note 15, at 10–21 (public forum); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the
First Amendment 140–41 (1965) (heckler’s veto); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition 8991 (1988) (heckler’s veto).

18.

Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5, at 205–9.

19.

Id. at 208.

20.

Id. at 212; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., “Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open”–A Note on Free
Speech and the Warren Court, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 289 (1968).
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of times, but in my mind I formulated hundreds of answers—and hundreds
of questions as well—as I observed him conversing with other students.
Similarly, reading a Kalven article or book is a participatory experience. One
is constantly “revising” the analysis, adding new applications or refinements,
imagining objections and responding to them. I suppose most teachers and
authors seek this effect; few actually aspire to have the last word. But Kalven
was extraordinary in his capacity to converse about law productively with
persons far less knowledgeable and insightful than himself, and in the process
raise them toward his level.
Exactly how does an inspiring teacher induce his students to probe and
create on their own? Is it simply by force of personal example? Or are there
techniques? Can someone not blessed with a mind so fertile as Kalven’s
nonetheless have the pedagogic impact that he had? As a teacher who would
love to do for my students what he did for me, I have pondered these questions
for years.
Certainly one secret to Kalven’s success was his utter lack of intellectual
pretense or arrogance. He wore his considerable erudition lightly. In matters
of the mind he did not seek to separate himself from others. Just the reverse.
He was intellectually gregarious and serendipitous. He did not believe that
all ideas or traditions or minds were equal—he had high standards, deep
commitments, and heroes—but he did believe that persons with no special
expertise or ability pertinent to the topic at hand could contribute to his
understanding, and not just to his understanding of them. In his writing and
teaching he lavished attention on the reasoning of judges whose talents were
modest and whose opinions he could easily have savaged. I doubt whether
any modern legal scholar has been so generous as he was in discussing judicial
opinions. And I do not think his intellectual generosity was a product of
personal kindness, deference to authority, or an aversion to confrontation. He
was generous with the thought of others because he believed he could learn
best by appreciating and building upon the ideas that moved ordinary people.
In fact, Harry Kalven’s distinctive understanding of the First Amendment
may be traced to his unusual respect for the thought processes not only of
ordinary persons but also of persons at the margins of society. Kalven did
not argue that dissenters ought to be tolerated, he argued that they ought to
be heard. He fought tirelessly in the law journals against those who would
require that acts of expression satisfy minimum standards of rationality and
civility in order to qualify for First Amendment protection. He believed that
the freedom of speech belongs to the inarticulate and the angry as well as to
the loyal and respectful opposition. His writings abound with sympathetic
translations distilling messages of social and cultural protest from expressive
endeavors that others would dismiss as self-indulgent or coercive rantings.
He did not think that “crackpots” and “subversives” and “extremists” deserve
First Amendment protection because they are harmless. He thought they
deserve protection because they have something to say that ought to be heard
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in a democratic society. Kalven’s passion for free speech was a product of his
curiosity and his humility, not any sense of noblesse oblige.
Strong proponents of free speech are often somewhat disengaged from the
struggles of their time, or sympathetic to the messages the dominant forces
seek to suppress, or so rigid in their embrace of principle that they become
more or less heedless of consequences. Kalven was none of the above. He
wanted to hear the voices of protesters, even the voices of fanatics, precisely
because he was an engaged, moderate, perceptive, and practical participant in
the controversies of his day. He thought that vigorous, fundamental challenge
contributes to understanding and effective adaptation.
He conducted his classroom in accordance with this belief. I have never
seen a teacher work so hard to elicit the “counter-argument” to whatever idea
he was proposing. He wanted the counter-arguments stated persuasively and
developed with imagination and respect. Seldom have I heard the arguments
for censorship presented so well as they were in his class.
His unfeigned interest in uncongenial ideas, his openness to challenge at
the most elementary level, proved to be a pedagogic boon. Because he brought
to the classroom a desire to learn as well as teach, he could introduce a subject
more sincerely, and more energetically, than any teacher I have known. One
classmate said of his teaching: “He begins each hour doing algebra and ends
each hour doing calculus.” The key point here, however, is that he found the
algebra fascinating.
Unlike most legal scholars who have reshaped their fields, Kalven
employed the individual case as the essential unit of his creative thought.
Probably the finest article written about his contributions to First Amendment
scholarship, by Kenneth Karst, is aptly entitled “An Appreciative Comment
on the Advantages of Thinking Small.”21 In his famous article on New York
Times v. Sullivan, Kalven writes as a “torts teacher” grappling with “the dizzying
consequence” of a landmark Supreme Court case “transmuting a part of his
domain—one that he traditionally does not reach until the last day of the
semester—into constitutional law, the Valhalla of the law school curriculum.”22
He told our class that the First Amendment will never lack for brilliant
philosophers, that what it will always need most is courageous, well-trained
lawyers. He greatly admired the legal foot soldiers who devise and defend the
procedures, presumptions, and burdens of proof that turn noble ideals into
potent operational constraints.
21.

Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on
the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1965).

22.

Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5, at 192.
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I took detailed notes in his torts class and uncharacteristically managed
not to lose the notebook. Twenty years later I found myself teaching torts.
On rereading the notes a few years after I started teaching the subject, I was
struck by how simple and straightforward were Kalven’s initial questions for
each class period. My teaching of the subject had been more elliptical. I had
truncated the introductions and jumped quickly to the hard questions and
elaborate theories. One year I attempted to do it Kalven’s way. I started each
hour with simple, basic questions, sometimes taken straight from his notes. It
didn’t work. In my hands the technique was artificial. I learned that I can only
teach spontaneously by moving as quickly as possible to the levels of analysis
that most excite me. To my students’ detriment, I did not have the patience,
the fascination with basic formulations, or the curiosity about the legal culture
that he possessed. The experience made me realize that Kalven’s ability to
think freshly—and excitedly—about some of the most familiar features of the
legal landscape was one of his greatest attributes, both as a teacher and a
scholar. His calculus was so sophisticated, so subtle, so original in large part
because he loved his algebra so much.
One expression of his fascination with basics was his penchant for
schematic exposition. A Kalven blackboard was certain to be covered with
diagrams, matrices, even hand-drawn maps and pictures illustrating how an
accident occurred. The practice was contagious. It became a game among my
classmates to concoct new, ever more elaborate matrices, sometimes to the
point of silliness. But he had the last laugh. In our lighthearted efforts to
caricature Kalven’s teaching style we wound up noticing relationships and
making connections on our own. I had assumed that his ability to induce us to
think originally through graphic emulation was an unintended by-product of
his schematizing impulse. But when he sent me off to begin my own teaching
career, his parting advice was: “Use visual aids.” From this conversation
I learned that he was, after all, a self-aware and calculating pedagogue. He
employed visual aids to challenge students, not to comfort them. He simplified
in order to investigate complexities and he wanted his students to do the same.
This commerce between the simple and the complex, between the beginning
student and the scholar at the forefront of his specialty, was central to Harry
Kalven’s view of knowledge and the process of discovery. He allocated his
time accordingly. One day he appeared in our First Amendment class seeming
exasperated and exhausted: “Don’t ever,” he said “try to teach proximate cause
and obscenity in the same week.” An accident of scheduling had caused him
to be covering the most philosophically challenging and doctrinally confusing
topic in the torts course at the same time he was tackling perhaps the most
perplexing segment of the First Amendment course. But he had been teaching
those subjects and writing renowned articles on them for years. The comment
revealed how hard he prepared for class each time he taught a subject, not
just by considering strategies of presentation but by rethinking his views on
the merits seriously enough to be tired and frustrated and confused. He may
have spent his time this way out of a sense of responsibility to his students,
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but I think more was involved. I am convinced that to an unusual degree his
writing grew out of his teaching, that he knew of no better way to grapple with
a subject than to think about it with a group of students—and to do so without
holding back.
People often behave in a manner that reflects the expectations others have
of them. Kalven treated his students as fellow explorers. His classes were
open-ended conversations. That is why some students found the class sessions
insufficiently structured, the points that emerged insufficiently conclusive. But
open-ended conversations have a way of continuing. And students who are
treated like original thinkers tend to keep thinking for themselves. And so,
Harry Kalven’s teaching endures.

